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ABSTRACT
Organizations Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are the most complex cyberattacks
and are generally executed by cyber attackers linked to nation-states. The motivation behind
APT attacks is political intelligence and cyber espionage. Despite all the awareness,
technological advancements, and massive investment, the fight against APTs is a losing battle
for organizations. An organization may implement a security strategy to prevent APTs.
However, the benefits to the security posture might be negligible if the measurement of the
strategy’s effectiveness is not part of the plan. A false sense of security exists when the focus
is on implementing a security strategy but not its effectiveness. This research verifies whether
organizations are in a false sense of security while preventing APT attacks, what factors
influence the false sense of security, and whether organizational culture influences factors
contributing to the false sense of security. The research method utilized was survey-based
quantitative research. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modeling
(SEM) were employed in the research model evaluation and hypotheses testing. The data
analysis found that the sense of security value among the employees is low, which proves that
employees are not confident about their organization’s cybersecurity posture and organizations
are in a false sense of security. Since Security Awareness and Training, Security Controls,
Redundant IDS/IPS, and Cybersecurity Insurance positively influence the sense of security,
recommendations were provided to enhance their effectiveness. The research study highlighted
that sense of security of the employees is low when the security controls are ineffective. The
contribution of this research is to highlight the paradigm shift required for organizations while
setting up defenses against APTs. While organizations focus on setting up security controls to
satisfy the compliance requirements, the research study outcome emphasizes the importance of
the effectiveness of security controls. The dissertation includes limitations of the research and
suggestions for further study.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Problem
The United States Air Force coined the phrase advanced persistent threat (APT) in 2006
(Betlich, 2010). An advanced persistent threat (APT) is a prolonged, aimed attack on a specific
target in which cyber attackers gain access to a system or network and remains there for an
extended period without being detected. The goal of APT attackers is generally stealing data
and intellectual property. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) occupy news headlines often
because of the potential damage they can cause regarding reputation, data (both consumer and
corporate), and intellectual property. The infamous cyberattack on credit rating agency Equifax
in February of 2017 is still in people’s minds. The US Department of Justice confirmed that a
team of hackers from the Chinese military was behind the attack on Equifax, in which
personally identifiable information (PII) of over 147.9 million people was stolen (Sass,
2020). The computer security firm Eset recently reported that state-sponsored Russian hackers
carried out a cyberattack on San Francisco International Airport (SFO) in March 2020. San
Francisco International Airport (SFO) revealed that some users of its websites
(SFOConnect.com and SFOConstruction.com) might have had their logins stolen by Russian
hackers. APTs are a looming threat to large and small enterprises; several vaunted enterprises
like Google, RSA, DuPont, Walt Disney, Johnson & Johnson, Morgan Stanley, Sony, General
Electric, etc., were victims of APTs (Grimes, 2011).
NIST defines APT as “An adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise and
significant resources which allow it to create opportunities to achieve its objectives by using
multiple attack vectors (e.g., cyber, physical, and deception). These objectives typically include
establishing and extending footholds within the information technology infrastructure of the
targeted organizations for purposes of exfiltrating information, undermining or impeding
10

critical aspects of a mission, program, or organization, or positioning itself to carry out these
objectives in the future. The advanced persistent threat: (i) pursues its objectives repeatedly
over an extended period; (ii) adapts to defenders’ efforts to resist it; and (iii) is determined to
maintain the level of interaction needed to execute its objectives” (NIST, 2013). Richard
Bejtlich, a well-known cybersecurity expert, explains what APT stands for as follows (Betlich,
2010):
•

Advanced means the attackers are highly skilled in hacking techniques and
sophisticated hacking tools. The attackers start their intrusion efforts by exploiting wellknown vulnerabilities. They can up their game to research new vulnerabilities and
develop custom exploits if the initial intrusion efforts are unsuccessful.

•

Persistent means the attackers are focused on the target and set to accomplish a mission.
They are not hit and run attackers, but they remain the victim’s network evading
detection to steal sensitive data over a prolonged period. Persistent does not necessarily
mean that the attackers continuously perform malicious activities in the victim's
network. The attackers perform the minimum action needed to execute their objectives
and avoid detection.

•

Threat means the adversary is not merely a piece of malicious code. The attackers are
organized, funded, and motivated, and their successful intrusion attempts result in
potential damage to the organization's finances and reputation.
APTs are distinct from hit and run hacking events because APTs have the following

distinguishing characteristics: Customized, Persistent, Organized, Funded, Sophisticated
(Advanced tools and techniques), and Timeliness. Nation-state sponsored agents or
cybercriminals execute advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). APTs are prolonged and targeted
cyberattacks. Cybercriminals use multiple vectors and entry points to navigate defenses to
breach into enterprise networks and evade detection for months. APTs present a challenge for
organizations because of their complexity, duration, and undetectability.
The dictionary definition of “false sense of security” is simply the belief that some
situation is safer than it is (Merriam-Webster, 2022). Technologies and processes often provide
organizations with a false sense of security. “Attackers consistently prey on companies that
11

have what cybersecurity experts call a ‘false sense of security’ when it comes to relying too
much on technology to defend their networks” (Pilkey, 2017). Enterprises rely on technical
solutions to protect themselves from APTs and are in a false sense of security. Though advanced
technology solutions are available and currently used in organizations, APTs are still
happening. Whether large, medium, or small, no organization is immune to these attacks
(Thummala, 2016). An organization may implement a security strategy, but the benefit to the
security posture might be negligible. A false Sense of Security exists when the focus is on
implementing a security strategy but not on the effectiveness of the security strategy.

Statement of the Problem
The purpose of our research is to determine why technological solutions fail to protect
organizations from APTs and decide which security controls need to be implemented, finetuned, and enhanced, along with technical solutions to protect organizations from APTs. Our
research study identifies the missing pieces of the puzzle to defend organizations from APT
attacks. Our research study benefits organizations in protecting their data and intellectual
property from APT actors, who are generally cybercriminals based in foreign countries. The
research study identifies security policies, procedures, and configurations to focus on in the
pursuit of defeating advanced persistent threats (APTs). The research is survey-based
quantitative research; based on the survey outcome, we propose remediations regarding
implementing and enhancing security policies, procedures, and configurations to set up
defenses against APTs.

Objectives of the Research
•

Identify the gap between how employees working in the cybersecurity domain feel
about cybersecurity and the implemented cybersecurity practices. Verify whether there
is a false sense of security among organizations by relying too much on technical
solutions and less on best practices or not. Identify what is missing in setting up defenses
against APT attacks.

•

Identify the gaps left by the standard security testing methodologies like OSSTMM
(Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual), OWASP (Open Web
12

Application Security Project), NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology),
PTES (Penetration Testing Methodologies and Standards), and ISSAF (Information
System Security Assessment Framework).
•

Identify the best practices that enhance defenses against APTs when implemented along
with the existing technologies.

Research Questions
The escalation in the number of cyber incidents shows no sign of abating. Despite all
the awareness, technological advancements, and massive investment, the fight against APTs is
a losing battle. It seems logical to look at how APT defenses are set up and consider whether
organizations are in a false sense of security. Shall organizations need to think about APT
detection strategies? The answer could be lurking in the shadows. In this research, we aim to
contribute to the cybersecurity domain by verifying whether there is a false sense of security
among organizations. If a false sense of security does exist among organizations, our research
highlights what is missing when considering the defenses to prevent APT attacks.
Our research begins with the following questions:
RQ1. Are organizations in a false sense of security while relying on off-the-shelf tools
to protect against APT attacks?
Implementing and improving security policies, procedures, and configurations is the
first and most crucial step in the pursuit of defeating advanced persistent threats (APTs)
(Nadeem, 2016). Our research question provides an answer to whether organizations are in a
false sense of security by focusing more on tools and less on security policies, procedures, and
configurations or not.
RQ2. What are the most critical factors (practices/controls) contributing to the false
sense of security? Is there any relationship among these factors?
Cybersecurity program provides a roadmap for security management practices and
controls. The success of the security program depends on the effectiveness of these practices
and controls. What factors (practices/controls) contribute most to the false sense of security? Is
there a correlation among factors (practices/controls) for the security program's success or
absence of the false sense of security?
13

RQ3. Does organizational culture influence the setup of defenses against APT attacks?
“Information security culture is a subculture of an organization’s culture. (Huang &
Pearlson, 2019). To enhance an organization’s cybersecurity culture, management must
implement the latest technology and invest in the organizational culture (Huang & Pearlson,
2019). Since organizational culture is important in cybersecurity, our research question
provides an answer to how a false sense of security is present among organizations with
different organizational cultures.

Dissertation Outline
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the relevant
literature for the problem area defined in Chapter 1. The chapter ends with a summary of
findings from the literature review. Chapter 3 presents the research design, hypotheses
statements, research method, and implementation. The chapter also includes a description of
research constructs and an operational definition of constructs. Chapter 4 presents data analysis.
Data analysis includes the assessment of measurement model, assessment of structural model,
and hypotheses testing. The chapter also presents a discussion of data analysis. Chapter 5
discusses what measures organizations consider in improving employees’ sense of security to
defend against APT attacks. Chapter 6 starts with the summary of research completed. The
chapter presents limitations of the research. The chapter presents the research contributions and
ends with discussing the future work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review explored the cyber kill chain framework developed by Lockheed
Martin, challenges with advanced cybersecurity tools, compliance frameworks, and security
testing methodologies. The cyber kill chain framework employs tools for the identification and
prevention of cyber intrusions activity.

Cyber Kill Chain Framework by Lockheed Martin
Kill Chain is a term that originated in the military, which defines a series of steps an
adversary follows to attack a target. In 2011, using the Kill Chain concept, Lockheed Martin
developed the Cyber Kill Chain framework (Spitzner, 2019). The Cyber Kill Chain identifies
what the adversaries must complete achieving their objectives (Lockheed Martin, 2019). By
understanding the Cyber Kill Chain framework, defenders are better prepared to identify and
stop attackers at each of the respective stages. The closer to the beginning of the cyber kill chain
of an attack, the better the attack can be stopped. Moreover, the more stages at which defenders
can intercept the attackers, the chances of detecting and terminating the attacks are higher. So,
defenders should be equipped with tools to detect and prevent APTs in all cyber kill chain
stages. There are seven stages in Lockheed Martin’s cyber kill chain as shown in Figure 1: 1)
Reconnaissance, 2) Weaponization, 3) Delivery, 4) Exploitation, 5) Installation, 6) Command
& Control, and 7) Action on Objectives (Lockheed Martin, 2019).

Figure 1.

Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain

Reconnaissance
In the reconnaissance stage, adversaries begin with a target organization, gather
information about the target, and look for vulnerabilities. Information gathering activities can
be passive or active (Death, 2018; Pols, 2017). In the active information method, adversaries
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run scanning and fingerprinting tools against an organization’s systems deployed in the
demilitarized zone (DMZ) to uncover ports that are vulnerable to exploitation and find out the
technology stacks of the systems. Adversaries can also identify security systems in place, such
as firewalls, intrusion prevention systems, and authentication mechanisms. In the passive
information gathering method, adversaries gather information about the organization and its
employees using publicly available databases and social media networks.
Weaponization
During the weaponization stage, adversaries do not interact with the targeted victim but
devise methods to get inside the victim’s network. In the weaponization stage, the adversaries
develop customized malware to exploit the vulnerabilities discovered during the reconnaissance
stage (Death, 2018). Customized malware could be delivered by social engineering methods or
exploitation of vulnerabilities discovered in the systems during the reconnaissance stage.
Delivery
In the cyber kill chain's delivery stage, the adversaries transmit the custom-developed
malware to the victim’s systems for exploitation (Hutchins et al., 2011). Spear-phishing attack
targeting internal employees of the organization is the most common method to transmit
malware into the organization’s internal systems (Verizon, 2019). Ninety percent of APT
groups use spear-phishing as an effective way to deliver malware into a company's internal
network (Positive Technologies, 2019).
Exploitation
In the exploitation phase, the attacker's code triggers exploitation. Attackers target an
application or operating system vulnerability for exploitation. Intruders may merely perform
exploitation by persuading the victim to open an executable attachment or leverage a feature of
the operating system that auto-executes code (Croom, 2010).
Installation
At the installation stage, the already delivered malware downloads additional
components to create a persistent backdoor or another ingress accessible to the adversary
outside the victim’s network for an extended period (Death, 2018).
Command & Control
In the command and control stage, the adversaries establish a command channel to the
victims’ systems or network to remotely manipulate the victim. At this stage, adversaries can
16

move deeper into the network, exfiltrate data, and conduct destructive operations like Denial of
Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) (Death, 2018). At this stage, the
adversaries are equipped with hands-on keyboard access to the victim’s systems to execute
actions to achieve their objectives (Croom, 2010).
Actions on Objectives
The actions and objectives of the attackers are dependent on their specific mission. The
most common objective is data exfiltration: collecting, encrypting, and stealing information
from the compromised system (Croom, 2010). The adversaries devise methods to avoid
detection by the victim’s monitoring/alerting systems while performing their intended actions.
APT Prevention and Detection Tools
The following table (Table 1) provides the most important tools used at various cyber
kill chain stages to stop APT attacks. Both Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) and Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) tools process data from
all stages of the cyber kill chain. Besides, they are relatively new compared to the other tools
mentioned in Table 1. Thus, SIEM and SOAR tools are covered more in the discussion.
Table 1.
Cyber Kill Chain Stage
Reconnaissance

Available Tools to Stop APT Attacks
Type of Tools

Description of Tools
•

Firewall, Web Analytics

Firewalls are the first layer of defense against

tool (Lockheed Martin

APT attacks because they play the role of

Corporation, 2015)

controlling network visibility and enforcing
security policies (TrendMicro, 2017). Firewalls
segment organizations' networks into zones and
control inbound and outbound traffic between
network zones and the Internet by enforcing the
organization's security policies. Configuration of
firewalls is critical to prevent APTs. Firewalls
must be configured accurately and intelligently to
analyze and block any network traffic that signals
APTs (Wool, 2016).
•

Web servers are public-facing assets of
organizations. Web Analytics tools provide the
ability to correlate logging events based on time
and user activity. Abnormal user activities like
intelligence gathering on the website, repeatedly
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entering invalid inputs, etc., indicate an intention
to breach (Coleman, 2016; Lockheed Martin
Corporation, 2015)
Weaponization

•

Network Intrusion

NIDS tools monitor network-based traffic and

Detection System (NIDS)

activity. NIDS tools detect malicious activities by

Network Intrusion

examining network activity logs and network

Prevention System (NIPS)

packets moving across the network. NIDS tools

(Lockheed Martin

use anomaly-based and signature-based detection

Corporation, 2015)

techniques to analyze log files for malicious
activities (Belding, 2019).
•

NIPS tools are similar to NIDS tools, except for
one significant difference; NIPS tools take
appropriate action when malicious activity is
detected (Belding, 2019).

Delivery

•

Proxy Filter, Inline Anti-

Proxy Server/Web Filter helps organizations with

Virus (Lockheed Martin

web content filtering, blocks users from accessing

Corporation, 2015)

known malicious sites, spam/phishing sites, proxy
avoidance sites, pornography, and all other
categories of websites deemed unnecessary for
normal business operations (Frenz & Diaz, 2017).
•

The objective of an inline antivirus solution is to
prevent malware delivered via email. During each
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) session,
the Inline antivirus solution effectively stops
malicious software at the email entrance to your
network (MDaemon Technologies, n.d.).

Exploitation

•

Host Intrusion Detection

Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) works

System (HIDS), Vendor

by taking a snapshot of the existing system files

Patch, Enhanced

and comparing it to the previous snapshot. If the

Mitigation Experience

critical system files were modified or deleted, the

Toolkit (EMET)

alert is sent to the administrator to investigate

(Lockheed Martin

(Rozenblum, 2001).
•

Corporation, 2015)

“Patch management can be the most effective tool
used to protect against vulnerabilities and the
least expensive to maintain if implemented
effectively” (Ruppert, 2007). Patch Management
System (PMS) is a tool that distributes, installs,
and manages patches (Seo & Moon, 2006). PMS
can automate the patching of operating systems
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and applications running on endpoints and
servers.

•

The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit
(EMET) prevents attackers from gaining access to
computer systems. EMET works by anticipating
the most common techniques attackers might use
to exploit computer systems vulnerabilities and
help protect by diverting, terminating, blocking,
and invalidating those actions and techniques.
Data Execution Prevention (DEP) is a feature of
EMET. DEP can help protect your computer by
monitoring your programs to use system memory
safely. If DEP notices a program misusing
computer memory, it closes the program and
notifies the user (Microsoft Corporation, 2016).

Installation

HIDS, AntiVirus

•

HIDS

(Lockheed Martin

•

Anti Virus

NIDS, Firewall, NIPS

•

NIDS

(Lockheed Martin

•

Firewall

Corporation, 2015)

•

NIPS

Audit Log Analysis, Data

•

Security Information and Event Management

Corporation, 2015)
Command & Control (C2)

Actions on Objectives

Loss/Leak Prevention

(SIEM) tools collect, and aggregate log data

(DLP) (Lockheed Martin

generated in the organization's infrastructure (host

Corporation, 2015;

systems, applications, network, and security

Security Boulevard, 2018)

devices/applications such as firewalls and
antivirus filters). The SIEM software then
analyzes the data aggregated to identify securityrelated incidents and events, such as successful
and failed logins, malware activity, and other
possibly malicious activities. It sends alerts to the
security operations team (Pratt, 2017).
•

Data leakage prevention (DLP) tool is a solution
for identifying, monitoring, and protecting
sensitive data as per the organization’s data
security policies. A DLP tool’s main objective is
to prevent sensitive data from leaking out of the
organization (Razi K, 2017).
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Challenges with Prevent APTs
There are various tools to detect and prevent APTs at all stages of the cyber kill chain
offered by several vendors. According to Radicati, the market for APT protection solutions is
expected to grow from $4.3 billion in 2019 to over $9.4 billion by 2023 (The Radicati Group
Inc., 2019). According to FireEye, the global median dwell time (the number of days an attacker
is present on the victim’s network before they are detected) decreased year after year, 101 days
in 2017, 78 days in 2018, and 56 days in 2019 (FireEye, 2019; Kovacs, 2020). The decreasing
dwell time trend is good. However, APT attacks are still happening even though organizations
are taking measures to detect and prevent APT attacks by installing tools. “Global data from
2018 found that 64 percent of all FireEye managed detection and response customers who were
previously Mandiant incident response clients were targeted again in the past 19 months by the
same or similarly motivated attack group” (FireEye, 2019).
It is difficult to detect APTs in the early stages of the cyber kill chain. Many APT
attackers use customized malware exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in the target’s systems.
APT attackers are skilled and focused adversaries who can use multiple vectors and entry points
to navigate around defenses to breach into the victim’s network and evade detection for months.
The more advanced the tools to detect and prevent are, the more advanced and skilled
adversaries are. This is an ongoing race between defenders and adversaries where adversaries
are gaining the upper hand. There are protocols to follow for a vendor to develop and release a
tool into the market, but adversaries can build and use tools without any obstructions. Tools
developed by vendors to detect and prevent APTs are general in nature to cater wider market,
though they are meant to apply at a specific stage of the cyber kill chain. Adversaries gain the
upper hand because tools developed by them are customized for specific targets.
Off-the-shelf solutions for individual servers or endpoints and network protection are
hopelessly outclassed by cyber attackers. Cyber attackers always devise a new technique to
bypass anti-malware software, sandboxes, and intrusion detection/prevention systems
(IDS/IPS) (Positive Technologies, 2019). “Advances in attacker sophistication have not been
matched by similar defensive advances. The concept of keeping the internal, trusted network
separated from the external, untrusted one (i.e., boundary protection) has become obsolete. The
use of blacklists or signatures for attack detection is practically useless against sophisticated
attackers. The security industry, having spent decades developing security products such as
20

anti-malware solutions and intrusion detection/prevention systems, refuse to admit the
shortcomings of these products” (Virvilis-Kollitiris, 2015). Employees are the first line of
defense for any organization. Therefore, they need to have security education and a sober
understanding of the protection systems in place to secure their key assets.
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) and Security Orchestration,
Automation, and Response (SOAR) tools have been used in Security Operations Centers
(SOCs). Both SIEM and SOAR tools are considered advanced tools for cybersecurity
operations; however, SOAR tools are not as common as SIEM tools. Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) solutions collect and analyze the event in system logs. The SIEM
tools' input is generally logs from firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems, network
appliances, database servers, application servers, etc. SIEM tools aggregate and correlate event
data logs from multiple systems and analyze that data to catch abnormal behavior indicating
potential cyberattacks. SIEM tools are equipped with analytics and machine learning tools
capabilities. SIEM tools check for event patterns and correlate event information between
devices for any anomalous activity and issue an alert when necessary. SIEM tools are not
created to unify people, processes, and technologies within a security operations center (SOC).
“While the SIEM detects the potential security incidents and triggers the alerts, a SOAR
solution then takes these alerts to the next level, responding to them, triaging the data, and
taking remediation steps where necessary” (DFLabs, 2019). SOAR tools add value to SOCs as
they automate and orchestrate time-consuming, manual tasks, including opening a ticket in a
tracking system, such as Jira, without requiring any human intervention. Using SOAR tools
SecOps team can automate incident response workflows.
SIEM and SOAR tools are advanced-level cybersecurity tools and appear to have the
potential to detect APTs, but there are challenges with these advanced-level tools. “SIEM tools
provide a central place to collect events and alerts – but can be expensive, resource-intensive,
and customers report that it is often difficult to resolve problems with SIEM data” (Petters,
2020). Most of them will reflect the following as major issues with the adoption and operations
of SIEM products: 1) Initial adoption takes time because of the time needed for coordination
from various IT organization stakeholders. 2) Time to value realization is very high. 3)
Correlation of events is difficult to achieve, leading to a high number of false positives. 4)
SIEMs are very high maintenance products. 5) Out-of-the-box reports from SIEM products are
21

mostly useless and require quite a bit of work to get meaningful reports. 6) Operational costs
outweigh the benefits (Shukla, 2019). SOAR tools are still not popular yet. According to
Gartner, “By year-end 2022, 30% of organizations with a security team larger than five people
will leverage SOAR tools in their security operations, up from less than 5% today” (Demisto,
2019). SOAR tools are still evolving, and reliance on SOAR tools for APT detection is not
reliable yet. Charles Herring, Chief Technology Officer at Witfoo, says, “If you do not have the
critical/basic controls in place, it makes no sense to do advanced controls like SOAR” (Herring,
2020).
Cyber attackers always devise a new technique to bypass anti-malware software,
sandboxes, and IDS/IPS systems. Though SIEM and SOAR tools are advanced, there are
implementation challenges to make the tools effective. Jurgen Kutscher, Executive Vice
President of service delivery at FireEye, says, “FireEye Mandiant has seen organizations largely
improving their level of cybersecurity sophistication, but combatting the latest threats is still a
huge challenge for them” (Kovacs, 2020). The projection for APT protection solutions is
expected to grow from $4.3 billion in 2019 to over $9.4 billion by 2023. However, organizations
are not looking at the missing pieces of the puzzle to defend against APTs.
With the heavy focus on tools to prevent APT attacks, non-technical attack vectors like
insider threat and social engineering are not given much-needed attention. The Verizon 2019
Data Breach Investigations report states that 34% of all breaches in 2018 were caused by
internal actors (Verizon, 2019). In 2018, 60% of breach investigations can attribute successful
social engineering as the conduit to the initial point of entry (Help Net Security, 2019).
The committed implementation of a cybersecurity framework is one of the missing
pieces in the puzzle to defend against APTs. According to Cris Thomas, strategist, Tenable
Network Security, cybersecurity frameworks help organizations create a solid baseline for
measuring security effectiveness and meeting compliance requirements. Implementing security
frameworks can be challenging without the tools, talent, and support from executive leadership.
A study conducted by Tenable Network Security and the Center for Internet Security (CIS)
found that 95% of organizations face significant challenges when implementing leading
cybersecurity frameworks. The same study reports the top five impediments to cybersecurity
framework implementation as follows: 1) Lack of trained staff; 2) Lack of necessary tools to
automate controls; 3) Lack of budget; 4) Lack of appropriate tools to audit continuous
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effectiveness of controls; 5) Lack of integration among tools (Seals, 2013). Because of the
implementation challenges of cybersecurity frameworks, most organizations implement
cybersecurity frameworks just enough to satisfy auditing requirements.
Penetration testing is driven by a management directive as an activity to address the
issue of cybersecurity but is not aligned with the actual intent of the testing. The use of
penetration testing is commonly an objective to an adverse audit outcome or cybersecurity
incident. Penetration testing used in this fashion provides little or no value to the organizations.
Besides, penetration testing is only as good as the tools, the tester, and the methodology applied
(Valli et al., 2014). The success of testing security controls depends on the selection of the right
security testing framework, like MITRE’s ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and
Common Knowledge), PTES (Penetration Testing Methodologies and Standards), etc. Security
teams or organizations gravitate to compliance-type frameworks, ones with checkboxes that
can represent a false sense of security and defense (Bromiley, 2020). Compliance-type
frameworks are relatively static, and they do not cover the current threats. Red teaming activity
is common in mature and security-focused organizations. The challenge with red teaming
activity is time and money. Red teaming is not a possible activity for most organizations.
Organizations implement multiple security controls to defend their security posture, but all
security controls are not tested simultaneously. Testing all security controls simultaneously
means all defenses are attacked at the same time. Testing all security controls simultaneously
is not a practice covered by any security testing framework. One example of testing all security
controls at the same time is simulating data exfiltration activity. When data exfiltration is
simulated, DLP solution, firewalls, NIDS, HIDS, and SIEM are tested. Testing DLP, firewalls,
NIDS, HIDS, and SIEM independently does not give much value compared to simultaneous
testing all controls in the exfiltration path. In an organization, different stakeholders are
responsible for different security defenses (controls). Thus, testing all defenses at a single point
in time requires challenging coordination but is necessary.

Security Controls to Remediate APTs
Immensely few academic publications contributed to the remediation strategies
exclusively for APT attacks. Bukac et al. proposed a response strategy based on the kill chain
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concept (Bukac et al., 2014). This strategy aims to collect as much information as possible when
an incident occurs and then perform remediation efforts. Messaoud et al. proposed an APT
lifecycle model based on attackers’ objectives (Messaoud et al., 2017). They suggested four
protection technologies. However, they all focus on only technical controls. Brewer et al.
suggested an analytics-driven approach to defending against APTs (Brewer, 2014). Mohsin and
Anwar discussed an ontology-based approach that uses cyber threat intelligence to evaluate IoT
networks against APT attacks (Mohsin & Anwar, 2016). In addition to the remediation
strategies, risk management approaches are proposed for the APTs. In (L. X. Yang et al., 2018),
Yang et al. developed a risk management approach based on game theory to efficiently allocate
resources to fix insecure hosts in an organization. In (X. Yang et al., 2017), the risk assessment
is based on state evolution and is modeled as a constrained optimization problem. The risk is
measured by the maximum expected loss. In this work, an organization’s network is assumed
to be fixed; however, in real terms, the network configuration may vary over time. Granadillo
et al. proposed a dual approach by evaluating a given security countermeasure's technical and
financial impacts by performing a case study on APTs (Daniel Gonzalez Granadillo et al.,
2015). Adelaive et al. conducted a systematic review on the mitigation effects of APT attacks
(Adelaiye et al., 2018). They identified twelve mitigation techniques, almost all of them being
technical controls. Only a limited number of articles in their review discussed security
awareness. Their study identifies the low utilization of human intelligence and behavioral
patterns in preventing and detecting APT attacks. Further, the level of effectiveness of the
mitigation strategies is not obtainable from their study. No research study was found on the
topic of the effectiveness of security controls in the context of preventing APT attacks.

Chapter Summary
In our literature review, we found the following:
•

Cyber attackers outclass off-the-shelf solutions.

•

Employees need security education and a sober understanding of the protection systems
in place to secure their key assets.

•

If critical/basic security controls not in place, it makes no sense to do advanced controls
like SOAR.
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•

Heavy focus is usually on tools to prevent APT attacks. Non-technical attack vectors
like insider threat and social engineering are not given much-needed attention.

•

The effectiveness of security controls in preventing APT attacks has not been studied.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND
IMPLEMENTATION
During the literature review, we found the likely causes contributing to the losing battle
of corporations with APTs. Based on the literature review, in this chapter, we formally define
the research constructs, research model, operational definition of constructs, hypothesis
statements, and research method. The chapter also details research implementation and ends
with the chapter summary.

Research Design
The field of information systems research has contributed several theories pertaining to
the adoption and usage of technology. Theoretical models such as the Technology Acceptance
Model (TAM) (Davis, 1985), the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985), and the Health
Belief Model (Becker, 1974) exist and have been utilized in empirical research in information
security. However, the models (Ajzen, 1985; Becker, 1974; Davis, 1985) are based on
behavioral constructs and utilized to target individual behavior. There is a lack of empirical
research to evaluate organizational security strategies based on employees' subjective feelings
on security. Therefore, we investigate this problem and propose a theoretical model for
evaluating organizational security strategies in terms of the sense of security.
To formulate a research model that theorizes various factors that influence the sense of
security, we selected independent, dependent, and moderator variables from our literature
review. Employees’ confidence level about the strategic organizational activities of security
represents the sense of security. The key factors considered in the model include security
awareness and training, converged testing, security controls, segmentation, redundant IDS/IPS,
insider threat prevention, and cybersecurity insurance. The proposed research model is
illustrated in Figure 2.
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The common methods used to mitigate APTs include: 1) anomaly detection, 2)
whitelists, 3) blacklists, 4) intrusion detection system (IDS), 5) awareness, 6) deception, 7)
cryptography, 8) traffic/ data analysis, 9) Security Information and Event Management (SIEM),
10) pattern recognition, 11) risk assessment, 12) multi-layer security (Adelaiye et al., 2018).
Our selection of independent variables was primarily based on these methods. The NIST
Special Publication 800-171, “Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal
Systems and Organizations” also influenced our selection of constructs. NIST provides a
comprehensive framework of controls that organizations can follow to mitigate APTs. All the
independent variables are based on the current threat landscape and the industry best practices.
If the threat landscape changes, new independent variables could be needed for new security
controls to emerge.

Figure 2.

Theoretical Model

Independent Variables (Latent Variables)
We started our selection of independent variables based on the standard methods used
to mitigate APTs: 1) Anomaly Detection 2) Whitelists 3) Blacklists 4) Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) 5) Awareness 6) Deception 7) Cryptography 8) Traffic/ Data analysis 9) SIEM
10) Pattern Recognition 11) Risk assessment 12) Multi-layer security (Adelaiye et al., 2018).
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We continued our exploration of selecting independent variables by doing an extensive
literature review of APT attacks. We selected our independent variables based on the
information available on the notorious cyberattacks, industry best practices, and standard
methods to mitigate APTs found in our literature review.
Some of the standard methods used to mitigate APTs can be grouped into one control.
For example, Anomaly Detection, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and Traffic/ Data analysis
are one control because IDS systems work based on traffic/data analysis and anomaly detection.
One control or one independent variable IDS includes three APT mitigation methods: Anomaly
Detection, IDS, and Traffic/ Data analysis. Similarly, Whitelists and Blacklists can be treated
as one control or independent variable Firewall because Whitelists and Blacklists are associated
with Firewall implementation.
As the cyberattacks continue to grow, the security controls or defense mechanisms to
prevent those are also expanding. New controls are adopted to changing threats and
vulnerabilities. Every new control can be a candidate to be an independent variable in future
research. Our selection of independent variables is based on the current threat landscape and
industry best practices. If the threat landscape changes need for new security controls emerges,
and so do new independent variables.
Security Awareness and Training (SA)
“Security awareness training is a usually overlooked factor in most of implemented
information security programs” (Al-Daeef et al., 2017). In the context of Information
Technology (IT), security awareness and training programs are the typical means used to
communicate security requirements and appropriate behavior (Bada et al., 2014). Industry
compliance standards/requirements make organizations run security awareness programs.
Security awareness programs fail; failure means they do not have an impact. IT security
awareness and training program can quickly become obsolete if not updated with the
technology advancements, IT infrastructure and organizational changes, and shifts in
organizational mission and priorities (Wilson & Hash, 2003). If organizations do not keep their
security awareness and training programs current, employees find no value and lose motivation.
If compliance is the goal of an organization, it is much simpler to achieve. Achieving
an effect through user behavior change is a far more significant challenge. The “2020 IBM XForce Threat Intelligence Index” noted that “Over 8.5 billion records were compromised in
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2019, a number that’s more than 200 percent greater than the number of records lost in 2018.
The inadvertent insider can largely be held responsible for this significant rise. Records exposed
due to misconfigured servers (including publicly accessible cloud storage, unsecured cloud
databases, improperly secured rsync backups, or open internet-connected network area storage
devices) accounted for 86 percent of the records compromised in 2019” (IBM, 2020).
Phishing is the number one attack vector for credential theft, and the root cause of nearly
half of malware and ransomware infections. Security awareness programs educate employees
to recognize phishing and other latest attack vectors essential to protecting data. Organizations
need to keep their security awareness and training programs current and test users periodically
on what is taught in the training programs. It is important for an organization to test employees
and use punishment to reinforce the importance of being aware when clicking on links. Testing
employees will result in employees proactively using caution when opening emails,
attachments, and clicking on links (Carella et al., 2017).
Since the effectiveness of security awareness and training programs is significant to
defend against APT attacks, we selected “Security Awareness and Training” as one of the
independent variables in our study.
Converged Testing (CT)
“Technical or logical controls involve the hardware or software mechanisms used to
manage access and to provide protection for resources and systems. As the name implies, it
uses technology” (Chapple et al., 2018). Examples of logical or technical controls include
authentication methods (such as usernames, passwords, smartcards, and biometrics),
encryption, firewalls, and routers. “Administrative controls are the policies and procedures
defined by an organization’s security policy and other regulations or requirements. They are
sometimes referred to as management controls. These controls focus on personnel and business
practices” (Chapple et al., 2018). Examples of administrative controls include policies,
procedures, hiring practices, background checks, data classifications, and labeling. During
security testing (penetration testing, blue team testing, purple team testing, or red team testing),
the focus is on technical controls. Our literature review did not find any testing methodology
that includes technical and administrative controls in the security testing scope. We selected
converged (administrative + technical controls) testing as an independent variable.
Cybersecurity Insurance (CI)
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CISA defines cybersecurity insurance as “Cybersecurity insurance is designed to
mitigate losses from a variety of cyber incidents, including data breaches, business interruption,
and network damage” CISA (Cybersecurity Insurance | CISA, n.d.). Since APT attacks involve
data exfiltration and an organization can go bankrupt after a successful cyberattack, we
considered selected Cybersecurity Insurance as an independent variable to verify organizations'
preparedness for APT attacks.
Security Controls (SC)
Michael de Crespigny, CEO of the Information Security Forum (ISF ), says, “real
cybersecurity is not about technical controls. You need those, but they won’t provide the
complete answer because of the very dynamic nature of the internet” (InfoSecurity Magazine,
2012). The countermeasures that organizations implement to detect, prevent, reduce,
counteract, or minimize security risks are called security controls (IBM Cloud Education,
2019). A study done by the Darwin Deason Institute for Cyber Security found that the biggest
drivers of cybersecurity investment are “perceived risk reduction” and “compliance” (Moore et
al., 2015). “Perceived risk reduction” is subjective; CISOs invest in security controls that, in
their eyes at least, reduce the risk facing the firm. In the same study, subjects reported that
compliance obligations drive a significant fraction of the overall budget. Security controls based
on compliance requirements and subjective decisions cannot protect organizations from the
ever-changing threat landscape. Contemporary cybersecurity risk management practices are
primarily driven by compliance requirements, forcing organizations to focus on security
controls and vulnerabilities. Security controls should be built from threat intelligence to
complement controls focusing on compliance requirements and known vulnerabilities (Muckin
& Fitch, 2019).
According to Josh Lefkowitz, the CEO of Flashpoint, maintaining compliance should
never be the security program's end goal. He states that compliance does not guarantee security.
It is important to note that most data breaches in recent years have happened at compliant
businesses (Lefkowitz, 2018). Setting up the right security controls is one challenge and
effectively monitoring and auditing them is another challenge. Continuous monitoring enables
management to continually review business processes for adherence to and deviations from the
organization’s intended security posture. However, security controls’ monitoring is not a
common practice. According to a whitepaper published by Deloitte, continuous controls
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monitoring (CM) and continuous auditing (CA), and their benefits are known to most financial
and auditing executives. However, relatively few enterprises have realized the full potential of
CM and CA, particularly at the enterprise-wide level (Deloitte, 2010). Automatic auditing of
controls reduces the effort necessary for audits or certifications. If the control checks are done
manually, and the interval between audits is months or even years, it is impossible to detect
insufficient or changed controls (Koschorreck, 2011). Treating security monitoring as a
quarterly auditing process means most compromises will go undetected for weeks or months.
The attacks are continuous, and the monitoring must match (Conrad, 2014).
It is common to find auditors who audit security controls use a checklist approach. The
outcome of the checklist approach may not address the specific threats the company faces. The
auditors may completely miss controls supposed to be in place or recommend out of scope
controls. Instead of working from a checklist, if the auditors should work through threats and
risk analysis, they end up with a set of recommendations that are just tailored to that system
(Grossman, 2013).
Patch management is a critical security control that needs attention regarding how to
manage the patch management process. The infamous Equifax data breach is the result of
missing a patch. The patch management process involves identifying, acquiring, installing, and
verifying patches for products and systems. Several challenges complicate patch management.
If organizations do not overcome these challenges, patch management becomes ineffective and
leads to easily preventable compromises (Souppaya & Scarfone, 2013).
Since the current practices of deploying controls, monitoring, and auditing are not
enough to prevent advanced persistent threats, we selected “Security Controls” as one of the
variables to study.
Redundant IDS/IPS (RD)
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) appliances
are the first line of defense for organizations against cyberattacks. IPS and IDS systems are
traditionally divided into two categories: signature-based and anomaly-based. IDS/IPSs in both
types face an arsenal of challenges from attackers. The war between attackers and IPS/IDS
developers never ends (Cheng et al., 2012). Even though an IPS/IDS system is mostly reliable,
there is a possibility that an attacker can evade it, which creates a large gap in cybersecurity.
IPS/IDS systems are improved continuously against evasion techniques, but new evasion
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techniques that can bypass IPS/IDS systems are still evolving (Kilic, Hakan Katal, Neset Sertaç
, Selcuk, 2019). The most crucial feature of IPS/IDS is detecting data exfiltration. If data
exfiltration is not detected, cyber attackers win the battle. Implementing redundant IPS/IDS
systems is a crucial component in setting up defenses against APT attacks. If one IPS/IDS
cannot detect data exfiltration, another IPS/IDS from a different vendor may detect data
exfiltration. Having multiple products to monitor the same activity makes it easier for analysts
to confirm the validity of alerts and identify false positives and also provides redundancy should
one product fail for any reason (K. A. Scarfone & Mell, 2007). So, we selected “Redundant
IPS/IPS” as one of the variables to study. Redundant IDS/IPS can be included in the Security
Controls variable, but we deliberately excluded it because IDS/IPS is the first defense cyber
attackers need to exploit to evade detection of data exfiltration. So, Redundant IDS/IPS plays
an important role in the defense in depth strategy and so needs more focus in the research study.
Segmentation (SG)
Data and network segmentation are essential in protecting organizations from
cyberattacks. Network segmentation is an architectural approach that involves dividing a larger
network into smaller network segments, which can be accomplished through firewalls, virtual
local area networks, and other separation techniques. Network segmentation allows network
administrators to control traffic flow between zones (segments) with granular policies.
According to Palo Alto Networks, the coarser network zones (and the corresponding security
policy rules that allow traffic between zones) reduce the network's attack surface (Palo Alto
Networks, 2019).
Modern cyberattacks take advantage of weak security postures of data centers where an
attacker can move laterally within the data center between different systems to steal
information. Datacenter design includes segmentation as a fundamental information security
principle, but at its most basic level. Micro-segmentation is required to effectively protect data
centers from modern attacks; micro-segmentation down to the individual workload is needed
(Vincentis, 2017).
Segmentation of information sets is a vital component of cybersecurity. Data
segmentation is achieved by taking advantage of network segmentation; data gets stored in
separate network zones based on classification levels. The value of the information sets that
need to be protected may differ. The higher the value of the information set, the stricter the
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isolation required in implementing segmentation. The Gordon-Loeb Model suggests
segmenting databases (i.e., data segmentation) to protect data from cybersecurity breaches and
minimize the impact of any cybersecurity breaches that occur (Gordon et al., 2016). The same
segmentation principle can be applied to intellectual property like patents and designs and
source code repositories.
When a network is compromised, an attacker’s lateral movement is limited with
network segmentation preventing an attack from spreading. Besides, network segmentation is
an obstacle for insiders because sensitive data and systems can be isolated from “curious”
insiders. In April 2018, a poor network segmentation resulted in a cyberattack at NASA's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (Bradbury, 2019). So, we selected “Segmentation” as one of the
variables to study. Segmentation can be included in the Security Controls variable, but we
deliberately excluded it from Security Controls because segmentation plays an important role
in the defense in depth strategy. Segmentation technologies like Zero Trust are being adopted,
and new technologies are evolving. Segmentation needs more focus in the research study.
Insider Threat Prevention (IT)
“An insider threat is the risk posed by employees or contractors regarding the theft of
sensitive data, misuse of their access privileges, or fraudulent activity that puts the
organization’s reputation and brand at risk. The insider’s behavior can be malicious,
complacent, or ignorant, which in turn can amplify the impact to the organization resulting in
monetary and reputational loss” (Ben & Bhat, 2020). An insider threat program (ITP) is a set
of policies, tools, and security/threat assessment personnel focused on detecting insider threat
risks. The objective of an ITP is mitigating or preventing insider threat incidents (Greitzer et
al., 2019). An effective ITP incorporates several tools to help prevent, detect, and respond to
concerning behaviors and activity. These tools or technical controls fall into one of five
categories (Spooner et al., 2018):
1. User Activity Monitoring: Organizations need visibility into host-based activities on
their assets. This kind of visibility helps organizations prevent and detect malicious
insiders, but it will also play a key role in responding to and investigating an incident.
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2. Data Loss Prevention: DLP tools allow organizations to monitor and control how users
interact with data. Using the DLP tools, organizations implement policies that prohibit
users from copying content to removable media or emailing it out of the organization.
3. Security Information and Event Management: SIEM tools aggregate systems’ event
logs into a centralized repository and perform automated analysis on those logs. SIEM
systems can help detect anomalies, which may lead to discovering potentially malicious
insiders.
4. Analytics: Analytics tools extend the functionality of the SIEM by providing additional
advanced visualization capabilities such as charts and graphs that can make anomalies
more visually apparent
5. Digital Forensics and Investigations: These tools can be used to assist in the
investigation of malicious insider actions and provide the necessary evidence for
potential legal actions
A SANS Institute study ranked malicious insider threat as more damaging than accidental or
negligent staff. The report also confirmed that Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) was acting as
a driving force to increase insider threats. The policies of an ITP should be adaptive. One of the
signs of a matured ITP program is to have adaptive policies and procedures that change with
the evolving threats to minimize vulnerabilities (Greitzer et al., 2019). The use of BYOD
provides more opportunities for insiders to introduce risk, whether they are negligent or
malicious. Since insider threats are an essential attack vector in APT attacks, we selected
“Insider Threat Prevention” as one of the variables to study.
Dependent Variable
Sense of Security (SS)
Sense of Security (SS) can be better explained with the Japanese word, Anshin. Anshin
is formed by; “An” means to ease, and “Shin” is to mind. Someone feels Anshin when they are
free from worry and fear (Murayama et al., 2006). Confidence keeps someone away from worry
and fear, which means having confidence equals to Anshin. SS in our research represents the
confidence level of employees about the strategic organizational activities of security.
Moderator Variables
Organization Culture (OC)
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“Organizational culture is generally seen as a set of key values, assumptions,
understandings, and norms shared by members of an organization and taught to new members.
Organizational culture is an important moderator in business research” (Farooq & Vij, 2017).
According to Robert E. Quinn and Kim S. Cameron at the University of Michigan at
Ann Arbor, there are four organizational culture types: Clan, Adhocracy, Market, and Hierarchy
(Maloney et al., 2010).
•

Clan oriented cultures are family-like, focusing on mentoring, nurturing, and “doing
things together.”

•

Adhocracy oriented cultures are dynamic and entrepreneurial, focusing on risk-taking,
innovation, and “doing things first.”

•

Market oriented cultures are results-oriented, focusing on competition, achievement,
and “getting the job done.”

•

Hierarchy oriented cultures are structured and controlled, focusing on efficiency,
stability, and “doing things right.”
In the corporate world, start-up organizations generally have adhocracy oriented

cultures. The goal of any start-up organization is to do things first, fast, and capture the market.
It is ubiquitous to ignore or give low priority to cybersecurity with a false sense of security,
assuming they are low profile targets. Our research study could answer how organizational
culture impacts the false sense of security.
Table 2.

Constructs and Operational Definitions

Factor

Operational Definition

Security awareness and training

Effectiveness of security awareness and training

Converged testing

Implementation of converged testing

Security controls

Effectiveness of security controls

Segmentation

Effectiveness of segmentation

Redundant IDS/IPS

Implementation of redundant IDS/IPS

Insider threat prevention

Effectiveness of insider threat prevention

Cybersecurity insurance

Purchase of cybersecurity insurance

Sense of security

User confidence with strategic security activities

Organization culture

Type of organization culture (clan, adhocracy, market, or hierarchy) (Maloney et
al., 2010)
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There are seven constructs, as shown in Figure 2. Five of the constructs (Security Controls,
Insider Threat Prevention, Cybersecurity Insurance, Segmentation, and Security Awareness and
Training) need to be measured with a group of observable variables. The questions
corresponding to each construct with multiple observable variables are provided in Appendix
A.

Hypotheses
This research aims to find answers to 14 hypotheses:
H1: Successful implementation of security awareness and training positively impacts
the sense of security.
H2: Successful execution of converged testing positively impacts the sense of security.
H3: Successful implementation of security controls positively impacts the sense of
security.
H4: Successful implementation of segmentation positively impacts the sense of security.
H5: Successful implementation of redundant IDS/IPS positively impacts the sense of
security.
H6: Successful implementation of insider threat prevention positively impacts the sense
of security.
H7: Successful execution of cybersecurity insurance purchase positively impacts the
sense of security.
H8: Organizational culture moderates the relationship between security awareness and
training and the sense of security.
H9: Organizational culture moderates the relationship between converged testing and
the sense of security.
H10: Organizational culture moderates the relationship between security controls and
the sense of security.
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H11: Organizational culture moderates the relationship between segmentation and the
sense of security.
H12: Organizational culture moderates the relationship between redundant IDS/IPS and
the sense of security.
H13: Organizational culture moderates the relationship between insider threat
prevention and the sense of security.
H14: Organizational culture moderates the relationship between cybersecurity
insurance and the sense of security.

Research Method
Quantitative Research
Our research approach is quantitative using the survey method. “A quantitative
approach is one in which the investigator primarily uses postpositivist claims for developing
knowledge (i.e., cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific variables and hypotheses and
questions, use of measurement and observation, and the test of theories), employs strategies of
inquiry such as experiments and surveys, and collects data on predetermined instruments that
yield statistical data” (Creswell, 2003). The quantitative approach is the best choice when the
objective of the study is identifying factors that influence an outcome, the utility of an
intervention, or understanding the best predictors of outcomes (Creswell, 2003). Our research
goal is to identify the factors (security policies, best practices, procedures, and configurations)
to improve the defenses against advanced persistent threats (APTs).
Quantitative research uses deductive reasoning, where the researcher forms a
hypothesis, collects data to investigate the problem, and then uses the data from the
investigation for analysis. After the analysis is completed, conclusions are shared to prove the
hypotheses are not false or false (Shirish, 2014). Our quantitative study takes the path of survey
research as we need to collect the data for analysis. In survey research, the researcher must
affirm a model that identifies the expected relationships among these variables before
considering executing a survey. The survey is constructed to test the researcher’s stated model
against observations of the phenomena (Glasow, 2005).
Survey instrument
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The survey instrument consists of 45 questions where respondents are requested to
submit responses in the form of a Likert five-point scale with one representing “strongly
disagree” and five representing “strongly agree.” A five-point Likert-type scale is selected to
increase response rate and response quality along with reducing respondents’ “frustration level”
(Babakus & Mangold, 1992). There are seven constructs, as shown in Figure 2. Five of the
constructs (Security Controls, Insider Threat Prevention, Cybersecurity Insurance,
Segmentation, and Security Awareness and Training) need to be measured with a group of
observable variables. The survey questionnaire is designed to measure the latent variables
(constructs) that need to be measured with observable variables. The survey questions are
regarding cybersecurity controls and practices followed in the industry. The data collected is
participants’ opinions about cybersecurity controls and practices followed in the industry.
Along with the subject's opinion on cybersecurity controls, the survey gathers the subject's
Organization's Size (Small, Medium, or Large), Organization's Industry Sector, and
Organization's Culture(Clan, Adhocracy, Market, or Hierarchy).
Data collection
The survey population is cybersecurity professionals with five or more years of work
experience and work for a private (for-profit) organization. The Survey Monkey platform is
used to deliver the survey questionnaire and collect responses from the survey participants. The
survey is anonymous. We deliver the survey with the Anonymous Responses collector option
turned on. When the SurveyMonkey's Anonymous Responses collector option is turned on,
SurveyMonkey does not track and store identifiable respondent information in survey results.
The data collected from the SurveyMonkey platform does not contain any information that can
be used for de-identification. The survey will be provided by multiple collectors (social media
and email). Our LinkedIn contacts will receive a (URL) link to the survey form on Survey
Monkey in my LinkedIn feed (message). The survey will be delivered to members of
professional organizations such as ISSA (Information Systems Security Association), Silicon
Valley Chapter, ISSA San Francisco Chapter, and ISLF (Information Security Leadership
Foundation). The communication directors of both the ISSA chapters and ISLF will email the
link to the survey on Survey Monkey form in an email message to the chapter members. We
reach out to our former supervisors, colleagues, and professional contacts by email, requesting
them to participate in the survey. The email contains the (URL) link to the survey form on
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Survey Monkey. Our former supervisors, colleagues, and professional connections may
forward the survey to their team members. At DSU, the IRB to have the Office of Graduate
Studies distribute the link to the survey for eligible Ph.D. students at the DSU's Beacom College
of Computer and Cyber Sciences. The survey will be distributed to 1000 or more qualified
participants. We expect to get at least 300 responses.
Analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) allows for more precise testing of an instrument’s
factor structure. CFA addresses construct validity by assigning the items in an instrument to
their respective factors according to theoretical expectations (Ahmad, 2005). R Studio will be
used to conduct CFA. CFA assumes that researchers enter the factor analysis with a firm idea
about the number of factors they will encounter and which variables will most likely load onto
each factor. CFA provides factor loadings and factor correlations. Factor loading explains the
strength of the relationship between each item and the factors. A factor loading value of >= 0.7
indicates a strong relationship between the item (observable variable) and the factor. Questions
(observable variables) from the questionnaire with factor loading values of < 0.7 will be ignored
to condense the number of observable variables.
If two factors have a strong correlation, one of the factors will be eliminated. CFA helps
to determine the model fit. The result of the CFA analysis provides several model fit indices
like root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), and
Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) to determine model fit for further analysis (Kim et al., 2016).
Once unnecessary observable variables and factors are discarded, the theoretical model
will be ready to uncover the cause and effect relationships using the partial least square
structural equation model (PLS-SEM). The primary reasons for using PLS in this study are: (1)
The study is primarily intended for causal-predictive analysis (2) PLS requires fewer statistical
specifications and constraints on the data than the covariance-based strategy of LISREL (e.g.,
assumptions of normality), and (3) PLS is effective for those early-theory testing situations that
characterize the study (Park et al., 2012). Two more reasons for considering PLS-SEM are: (1)
The constructs in the study are formatively measured (Hair et al., 2014). (2) PLS-SEM is more
appropriate because the theory is less developed (Hamdollah & Baghaei, 2016). R Studio will
be used to conduct PLS-SEM.
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Research Implementation
As we planned, the Survey Monkey platform was used to administer the survey
questionnaire and collect responses from the survey participants. The survey was distributed to
600 qualified participants using email and LinkedIn in spring 2021. There were 253 returned
questionnaires out of the 600 distributed. 207 out of the 253 returned questionnaires were
useable, i.e., 82% completion rate.
We performed CFA first before testing the proposed hypotheses to ensure that the
instrument appropriately measures the latent constructs. We used R and R Studio to conduct
CFA. CFA assumes that researchers enter the factor analysis with a firm idea about the number
of factors they will encounter and which variables will most likely load onto each factor. CFA
provides factor loadings and factor correlations. Factor loading explains the strength of the
relationship between each item and the factors. A factor loading value of ≥ 0.7 indicates a strong
relationship between the item (observable variable) and the factor (Park et al., 2012). The
constructs with factor loading values of < 0.7 are ignored to condense the number of observable
variables.
The result of the CFA analysis provides several model fit indices like goodness-of-fit
index (GFI), adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), normed fit index (NFI), Tucker-Lewis
Index (TLI), comparative fit index (CFI), and root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) to determine model fit for further analysis (Kim et al., 2016). The model fit indices
from the CFA analysis were as follows: GFI = 0.890, AGFI = 0.840, NFI = 0.817, TLI =0.000,
CFI = 0.962, and RMSEA = 0.070. All are in the acceptable range (Hooper et al., 2008; Steiger,
2007).
We used Warp PLS 7.0 to perform structural equation modeling. Warp PLS provides
an integrated environment for combining measurement and structural models’ calculations.
Using Warp PLS, we examined the validity and reliability of our research instrument, model
accuracy, the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable, and how the moderator
variable influences the relation between independent and dependent variables. After CFA, we
fed our research model to Warp PLS to conduct SEM analysis. Table 3 shows the correlations
among the constructs.
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Table 3.
SA

SG

SC

CI

RD

CT

Correlation Matrix
SS

OC

IT

OC* OC*R OC*C OC*S OC*S OC*S OC*I
CT
D
I
C
G
A
T

SA
SG

0.807

SC

-0.647

CI
RD
CT
SS
OC
IT
OC*
CT
OC*
RD
OC*
CI
OC*S
C
OC*S
G
OC*S
A
OC*I
T

0.642

0.565
0.723 0.768
0.696
0.550
0.763 0.848
0.767 0.689
0.615
0.675 0.647
0.561 0.597 0.634
0.511
-0.015
0.027
0.006
0.132 0.011 0.071
0.856 0.865
0.674 0.728 0.805
0.632
-0.019 0.029
0.016 0.184 0.027 0.038
0.027 0.018
0.105 0.197 0.086 0.027
-0.157
0.052
0.070
0.276 0.180 0.167
-0.058
0.038 0.057
0.133
0.106 0.016
0.031 0.064
0.020 0.031
0.142 0.083
0.014 0.029
0.030
0.060 0.183
0.020
-0.007
0.022 0.106 0.195 0.004 0.065
0.670 0.715

0.154
0.612

0.049

0.214 -0.065
0.016
0.128 -0.005 0.711
0.022
0.281 -0.173 0.787 0.747
0.150
0.016
-0.103
-0.478 -0.556
0.198
0.627
0.004 0.195 -0.024 0.878 0.748

0.700 -0.598

0.025 0.224 -0.008 0.800 0.676

0.748 -0.676 0.776

0.196 -0.017 0.857 0.736
0.017

0.720 -0.619 0.896

0.858

As shown in Table 3, Warp PLS warned about the highly correlated constructs, CT and
SG (0.848), IT and SA (0.856), IT and SG (0.865), presented in the model. This led to the next
step in eliminating two constructs, CT and IT, which have correlations (> 0.85) with the SG.
The refined research model for evaluating the sense of security is shown in Figure 3.
After revising the model, we performed SEM analysis with Warp PLS again. The
analysis did not reveal any other correlations among the constructs. It implies that the
correlations among the constructs are within the acceptable range.

Chapter Summary
Based on the literature review, this chapter introduced research constructs, research
model, operational definition of constructs, hypothesis statements, and research method. In
addition, the chapter presented details on research implementation. In the research
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implementation phase, a survey was distributed to 600 qualified participants using email and
LinkedIn. There were 253 returned questionnaires out of the 600 distributed. 207 out of 253
returned questionnaires were useable, i.e., 82% completion rate. After the survey was
completed, using R Studio, CFA was performed to ensure that the instrument appropriately
measures the latent constructs. We used R and R Studio to conduct CFA. The factors with factor
loading values of < 0.7 are ignored to condense the number of observable variables. After CFA,
the research model was fed to Warp PLS to conduct SEM analysis. Before performing SEM
analysis, Warp PLS checks for highly correlated constructs. Convergent Testing and Insider
Threat Prevention constructs had correlations greater than 0.85 with other constructs in the
research model. So, we removed Convergent Testing and Insider Threat Prevention constructs
from the research model. We fed the updated research model to Warp PLS again to perform
SEM. No high correlations were found among the constructs in the updated research model.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS
In the previous chapter, we presented research constructs, research model, operational
definition of constructs, hypothesis statements, and research method. In addition, we provided
the details on research implementation. As part of the research implementation, we conducted
a survey and performed CFA to ensure that the instrument appropriately measures the latent
constructs. The factors with factor loading values of < 0.7 were ignored to condense the number
of observable variables. Next, we fed the research model to Warp PLS to conduct SEM analysis.
Warp PLS reported Convergent Testing and Insider Threat Prevention as constructs that had
correlations greater than 0.85 with other constructs in the research model. So, we removed
Convergent Testing and Insider Threat Prevention constructs from the research model. We fed
the updated research model to Warp PLS again to perform SEM. No high correlations were
found among the constructs in the updated research model. In this chapter, we discuss the
assessment of the measurement and structural models and testing of hypotheses statements
before moving discussion of the findings.

Assessment of Measurement Model
The indicators used in the model are reflective. We further assessed the observing
internal consistency, each indicator’s reliability, convergent reliability, and discriminant
validity for the refined model.
The first step in reflective measurement model assessment is examining the indicator
loadings. Factor loading values above 0.708 are recommended, as they indicate that the
construct explains more than 50 percent of the indicator’s variance, thus providing acceptable
item reliability (Hair et al., 2019). Factor loadings of all constructs are above the recommended
value of 0.708, as shown in Table 4.
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Figure 3.

Refined Research Model for Evaluating Sense of Security

The second step is assessing internal consistency reliability by examining composite
reliability (CR). CR values between 0.70 and 0.90 range from satisfactory to good. CR values
of 0.95 and above indicate the presence of redundant factors, thereby reducing construct validity
(Hair et al., 2019). The CR values of SA, SC, and SG are in the acceptable range. The CR values
of CI and RD are equal to one because both the constructs have only one factor. A higher CR
value indicates higher reliability if the CR value is not above 0.95. Therefore, CR values of all
constructs are in the good range. Cronbach’s alpha value is another measure of internal
consistency reliability that assumes similar thresholds (Hair et al., 2019). Cronbach’s alpha
value is described as excellent (0.93–0.94), strong (0.91–0.93), reliable (0.84–0.90), robust
(0.81), fairly high (0.76–0.95), high (0.73–0.95), good (0.71–0.91), relatively high (0.70–0.77),
slightly low (0.68), reasonable (0.67–0.87), adequate (0.64–0.85), moderate (0.61–0.65), not
satisfactory (0.4–0.55), and low (0.11) (Taber, 2018). The Cronbach’s alpha values of all the
constructs are shown in Table 4. The Cronbach’s alpha values of the constructs under study are
in the excellent to the reliable range.
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Table 4.
Construct
SA

SG

SC
CI
RD

Factor Loadings, CR, Cronbach’s Alpha, Dijakstra’s PLSc, AVE.
Indicators Loading
SA1
SA3
SA4
SG3
SG4
SG6
SG7
SG8
SC6
SC9
CI1
RD1

0.873
0.912
0.931
0.866
0.867
0.854
0.877
0.874
0.847
0.847
1.000
1.000

Composite
Reliability
0.932

Cronbach’s
Alpha
0.890

Dijakstra’s
PLSc
0.894

0.905

0.938

0.918

0.923

0.868

0.835

0.605

0.659

0.847

1.000
1.000

1.000
1.000

1.000
1.000

1.000
1.000

AVE

“While Cronbach’s alpha may be too conservative, the composite reliability may be too
liberal, and the construct’s true reliability is typically viewed as within these two extreme
values” (Hair et al., 2019). As an alternative, Dijkstra and Henseler proposed consistent PLS
(PLSc) as an approximately exact measure of construct reliability, whose value usually lies
between Cronbach’s alpha and the composite reliability (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015). The
Dijkastra’s PLSc values of all constructs lie between Cronbach’s alpha value and CR value, as
shown in Table 4. Internal consistency reliability of constructors was verified with factor
loadings, composite reliability, Cronbach’s alpha, and Dijkastra’s PLSc.
The third step of the reflective measurement model assessment is to examine the
convergent validity of each construct measure. “Convergent validity is the extent to which the
construct converges to explain the variance of its items” (Hair et al., 2019). The average
variance extracted (AVE) for all items on each construct is the metric used for evaluating a
construct’s convergent validity. An acceptable AVE is 0.50 or higher to establish convergent
validity (Hair et al., 2019; Kante et al., 2018).
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Figure 4.

Coefficient of Determination

The fourth step is to assess discriminant validity, which tests whether the concepts or
the measurements that are not supposed to be related are unrelated. Discriminant validity
represents the extent to which a construct is empirically distinct from other constructs in the
structural model (Hair et al., 2019). Discriminant validity is assessed with the heterotraitmonotrait (HTMT) ratio of the correlations. The HTMT is defined as the mean value of the
item correlations across constructs relative to the (geometric) mean of the average correlations
for the items measuring the same construct (Hair et al., 2019). The threshold value for HTMT
is 0.90, and the HTMT value above 0.90 suggests a lack of discriminant validity (Henseler et
al., 2015). The HTMT ratio values for the constructs in our model are below the threshold value
of 0.90, as shown in Table 5, confirming that discriminant validity is present.
Table 5.
SA
SG
SC
CI
RD

HTMT Ratios

SA

SG

0.893
0.882

0.861

SC
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CI

RD

Assessment of Structural Model
The structural model is used to estimate the relationships between the latent dependent
and independent variables. Before assessing the structural relationships, collinearity must be
examined to make sure that multicollinearity is not present. The variance inflation factor (VIF)
is the most common way to detect multicollinearity. VIF values above 5 are indicative of
probable collinearity issues among the predictor constructs (Hair et al., 2011, 2019). The VIF
values of predictor variables in our model are below, as shown in Table 6. Therefore, there is
no collinearity issue.
Table 6.
VIF

VIF Values

SA

SG

SC

CI

RD

3.902

4.447

2.014

2.855

3.156

The next step is examining the standard assessment criteria, including the coefficient of
determination (R2), the blindfolding-based cross-validated redundancy measure Q2, and the
statistical significance and relevance of the path coefficients (Hair et al., 2019).
The coefficient of determination (R2) is considered in the case of endogenous constructs
(Hair et al., 2019), but there are no endogenous constructs in our model. Since the R2 value is
a measure of a model predictive power and WarpPLS computes R2 value, we considered
examining R2 value. R2 value of 0.75, 0.50 and 0.25 can be considered substantial, moderate,
and weak (Hair et al., 2011; Henseler et al., 2009). The R2 value of our research model is 0.52,
as shown in Figure 4. Our model’s predictive power is moderate. “As a rule of thumb, Q2 values
higher than 0, 0.25 and 0.50 depict small, medium and large predictive relevance of the PLSpath model” (Hair et al., 2019). The Q2 value of our research model is 0.622. Thus, our research
model’s predictive relevance is high.

Hypotheses Testing
H1 states that successful implementation of security awareness and training positively
impacts the sense of security. Table 7 shows that the p-value of security awareness and training
on influencing the sense of security is 0.010 with the value of path coefficient of 0.161. This p-
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value is less than 0.05 (significance < 0.05). Therefore, it can be concluded that the successful
implementation of security awareness and training positively impacts the sense of security.
H2 states that successful execution of converged testing positively impacts the sense of
security. This hypothesis was dropped from the study as convergent testing is highly correlated
with the other predictor variable segmentation.
H3 states that successful implementation of security controls positively impacts the
sense of security. Table 7 shows that the p-value of security controls on influencing the sense
of security is less than 0.001 with the value of path coefficient of 0.280. This p-value is less
than 0.05 (significance < 0.05). Therefore, it can be concluded that the successful
implementation of security controls positively impacts the sense of security.
H4 states that successful implementation of segmentation does not impact the sense of
security. Table 7 shows that the p-value of segmentation influencing the sense of security is
less than 0.180 with the value of path coefficient of 0.064. This p-value is great than 0.05
(significance < 0.05). Therefore, it can be concluded that the successful implementation of
segmentation does not impact the sense of security.
H5 states that successful implementation of redundant IDS/IPS positively impacts the
sense of security. Table 7 shows that the p-value of redundant IDS/IPS on influencing the sense
of security is 0.011 with the value of path coefficient of 0.157. This p-value is less than 0.05
(significance < 0.05). Therefore, it can be concluded that the successful implementation of
redundant IDS/IPS positively impacts the sense of security.
H6 states that successful implementation of insider threat prevention positively impacts
the sense of security. This hypothesis was dropped from the study as insider threat prevention
is highly correlated with two predictor variables, segmentation and security awareness and
training.
H7 states that successful execution of cybersecurity insurance purchase positively
impacts the sense of security. Table 7 shows that the p-value of cybersecurity insurance
influencing the sense of security is less than 0.001 with the value of path coefficient of 0.236.
This p-value is less than 0.05 (significance < 0.05). Therefore, it can be concluded that the
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successful execution of cybersecurity insurance purchase positively impacts the sense of
security.
H8 states that organizational culture moderates the relationship between security
awareness and training and the sense of security. Table 7 shows that the p-value of
organizational culture on influencing the relationship between security awareness and training
and the sense of security is 0.004 with the value of path coefficient of 0.185. This p-value is
less than 0.05 (significance < 0.05). Therefore, it can be concluded that organizational culture
moderates the relationship between security awareness and training and the sense of security.
H9 states that organizational culture moderates the relationship between converged
testing and the sense of security. This hypothesis was dropped from the study as the predictor
variable convergent testing was dropped from the study.
H10 states that organizational culture moderates the relationship between security
controls and the sense of security. Table 7 shows that the p-value of organizational culture on
influencing the relationship between security controls and sense of security is 0.010 with the
value of path coefficient of 0.159. This p-value is less than 0.05 (significance < 0.05).
Therefore, it can be concluded that organizational culture moderates the relationship between
security controls and the sense of security.
H11 states that organizational culture moderates the relationship between segmentation
and the sense of security. Table 7 shows that the p-value of organizational culture on influencing
the relationship between segmentation and sense of security is 0.017 with the value of path
coefficient of 0.147. This p-value is less than 0.05 (significance < 0.05). Therefore, it can be
concluded that organizational culture moderates the relationship between segmentation and the
sense of security.
H12 states that organizational culture moderates the relationship between redundant
IDS/IPS and the sense of security. Table 7 shows that the p-value of organizational culture on
influencing the relationship between redundant IDS/IPS and the sense of security is 0.394 with
the value of path coefficient of 0.019. This p-value is great than 0.05 (significance < 0.05).
Therefore, it can be concluded that organizational culture does not moderate the relationship
between redundant IDS/IPS and the sense of security.
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H13 states that organizational culture moderates the relationship between insider threat
prevention and the sense of security. This hypothesis was dropped from the study as the
predictor variable insider threat prevention was dropped from the study.
H14 states that organizational culture moderates the relationship between cybersecurity
insurance and the sense of security. Table 7 shows that the p-value of organizational culture on
influencing the relationship between cybersecurity insurance and the sense of security is 0.358
with the value of path coefficient of 0.025. This p-value is great than 0.05 (significance < 0.05).
Therefore, it can be concluded that organizational culture does not moderate the relationship
between cybersecurity insurance and the sense of security.
Table 7.
Relation
H1 SA -> SS
H3 SC -> SS
H4 SG -> SS
H5 RD -> SS
H7 CI -> SS
H8 OC -> SA
H10 OC -> SC
H11 OC -> SG
H12 OC -> RD
H14 OC -> CI

PATH Coefficients

Path Coefficient
0.161
-0.280
-0.064
0.157
0.236
0.185
-0.159
-0.147
-0.019
-0.025

p-Value
0.010
<0.001
0.180
0.011
<0.001
0.004
0.010
0.017
0.394
0.358

Description
Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported

Discussion
There is news on data breaches due to APTs almost every day. The amount of money
spent on improving the security posture, whether it is on cybersecurity products, services, or
training, increases year by year. Despite all the awareness training, technological
advancements, and massive investment, the fight against APTs could be challenging for any
organization if their cybersecurity products, services, or training are not adequately or
effectively implemented. While managing cybersecurity posture, corporations focus on security
products and services but not on employees’ perception of cybersecurity posture. This research
is aimed at how employees feel about the security posture of corporations and the effectiveness
of security measures implemented by the corporations. We referred to employees’ perception
of cybersecurity posture as the sense of security and investigated what factors influence the
sense of security. Our survey found that employees are not confident about their organizations'
cybersecurity posture. The responses we received showed that the average value of employees’
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confidence about cybersecurity posture was 1.8 (Strongly Disagree 1, Disagree 2, Neither
Agree nor Disagree 3, Agree 4, Strongly Agree 5).
Our study confirms that security awareness and training, security controls,
implementation of redundant IDS/IPS, and purchase of cybersecurity insurance positively
influence employees’ sensor of security. This study also confirms that organizational culture
influences the relationship of security awareness and training and security controls with the
sense of security.
This research found that effective segmentation did not influence the employees’ sense
of security. The reason that our hypothesis regarding the segmentation was not supported might
be due to a lack of understanding/knowledge/awareness of segmentation. Our study confirms
that the organizational culture influences the relationship of segmentation with the sense of
security.
Cybersecurity is a vast domain. Since it is impossible to include many independent
variables in the research, we limited our independent variables to seven. During the SEM
analysis, we found that there were strong correlations (> 0.85) among converged testing, insider
threat prevention, and segmentation. We had to drop two independent variables, e.g.,
convergent testing and insider threat prevention, from the initial model.

Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we evaluated measurement and structural models before proceeding to
evaluate the hypotheses. As part of the measurement model assessment, first, we verified that
factor loading values are above 0.708. Next, we observed that internal consistency reliability,
convergent validity, and discriminant validity measures are in the desired range. As part of the
structural model assessment, we verified that no multicollinearity exists, and predictive power
and relevance are in the desired range. After successfully validating both measurement and
structural models, we tested hypotheses statements using path coefficient and p values. Our
survey found that employees are not confident about their organizations' cybersecurity posture.
The responses we received showed that the average value of employees’ confidence about
cybersecurity posture was 1.8, which is low, confirming that the organizations are in a false
sense of security. In the hypotheses testing, we found that a) successful implementation of
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security awareness and training positively impacts the sense of security (H1 supported) b)
successful implementation of security controls positively impacts the sense of security (H3
supported) c) successful implementation of segmentation does not impact the sense of security
(H4 not supported) d) successful implementation of redundant IDS/IPS positively impacts the
sense of security (H5 supported) e) successful execution of cybersecurity insurance purchase
positively impacts the sense of security (H7 supported) f) organizational culture moderates the
relationship between security awareness and training and the sense of security (H8 supported)
g) organizational culture moderates the relationship between security controls and the sense of
security (H10 supported) h) organizational culture moderates the relationship between
segmentation and the sense of security (H11 supported) i) organizational culture does not
moderate the relationship between redundant IDS/IPS and the sense of security (H12 not
supported) j) organizational culture does not moderate the relationship between cybersecurity
insurance and the sense of security (H14 not supported).
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CHAPTER 5
IMPROVING EMPLOYEES’ SENSE OF SECURITY TO
PREVENT APTS
In the last chapter, the research identified what constructs positively influences the sense
of security of employees. In the context of APTs, the research proved that inefficient
implementation of security controls results in a low sense of security of employees. In this
chapter, we recommend what controls to enhance based on the constructs to increase the sense
of security of employees.

Remediation Strategy to Prevent APTS
Since the effectiveness of the controls plays a significant role in combating the APTs,
we suggest the following recommendations for the constructs contributing to the false sense
of security.
Security Awareness and Training
Information security programs frequently overlook the importance of security awarene
ss. While organizations invest in security technology and continuously train security personnel,
very little is done to increase security awareness among the other employees (Aloul, 2012).
Unfortunately, the non-security personnel group is the weakest link to get trapped in social
engineering and phishing scams (Aloul, 2012). As it was known a few years ago, Scam email
had features such as a fake sender address and grammatical errors. Currently, targeted attacks
look more professional, with almost genuine-looking content. It is frightening to know that
Human Negligence drives 90% of cyberattacks, that 68% of employees fell for the phishing
mail, and that 92.4% of malware is delivered via a phishing email (Khan et al., 2020).
Security awareness and training campaigns typically track who took the training or
attended awareness sessions, the number of users who passed the exams, etc.
However, these campaigns fail to measure the impact of the awareness sessions (Aloul, 2012).
Because the effectiveness of security awareness and training campaigns are not measured,
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employees indicated a low sense of security regarding security awareness and training in our
survey. We recommend a cyber security awareness measurement model: Analyze, Predict,
Awareness, and Test (APAT) (Khan et al., 2020). APAT model involves a four-step cycle:
analyzing the current threats, predicting the impact of threats, providing security awareness and
training, and measuring the effectiveness of security awareness and training provided. The
APAT model solves the challenge of delivering an effective security awareness and training
program as the program outcome measurement is a part of the model. The APAT model also
addresses the challenge of providing relevant and updated training. Table 8 shows our
recommendation regarding security awareness and training and what controls to enhance in the
NIST 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls (NIST, 2020).
Redundant IDS/IPS
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) are the first lines
of defense against APT attacks. “APTs are specifically designed to defeat controls such as
firewalls, anti-virus and intrusion-detection systems, and especially those that rely on signatures
and can therefore guard only against known threats” (Tankard, 2011). If an organization's
IPS/IDS system can be bypassed, an attacker can quickly get inside the organization’s internal
network to perform the next steps in the cyberattack. Although IPS/IDS systems are constantly
improved, evolving evasion techniques can still bypass an IPS/IDS system.
We recommend redundancy in setting up IDS/IPS since Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS)/Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) are the first lines of defense for organizations.
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) technologies are classified into four
primary types: 1) network-based, 2) wireless, 3) network behavior analysis (NBA), and 4) hostbased (K. A. Scarfone & Mell, 2007). Each technology type offers benefits over the other, such
as detecting some events that the others cannot, detecting some events with significantly greater
accuracy than the other technologies, and performing in-depth analysis without substantially
impacting the performance of the protected hosts (K. A. Scarfone & Mell, 2007). The use
of multiple IDSs and other security systems gives a better picture of the monitored network;
they cooperate to complement each other's coverage (Elshoush, 2014). Even if each IDS uses
a different detection technique, they analyze each other's alerts and reduce false positives. A
reliable intrusion detection solution cannot be achieved without using multiple types of IDS/IPS
technologies (K. A. Scarfone & Mell, 2007). To improve intrusion detection capabilities, some
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organizations also use multiple products of the same IDPS technology type (K. A. Scarfone &
Mell, 2007). Since each product developer uses somewhat different detection methodologies
and detects some events that another product cannot, when multiple products are used to
monitor the same activity, it is easier for analysts to validate alerts and identify false positives,
and it also provides redundancy/reliability should one product fail (K. A. Scarfone & Mell,
2007).
Security Controls
Security controls are the countermeasures that organizations implement to detect,
prevent, reduce, counteract, or minimize security risks are called security controls (IBM Cloud
Education, 2019). Today's cyber security risk management practices are primarily driven by
compliance requirements, forcing organizations to focus on security controls and vulnerabilities
(Muckin & Fitch, 2019). Our literature review found that one of the biggest drivers of
cybersecurity investment is compliance, and compliance obligations drive a significant fraction
of the overall budget. Security controls based on compliance requirements cannot protect
organizations from the ever-changing threat landscape. To address the ever-changing threat
landscape, security controls should be built from threat intelligence to complement controls
focusing on compliance requirements and known vulnerabilities (Muckin & Fitch, 2019).
Threat Intelligence (TI) is the knowledge about adversaries and their motivations,
intentions, and methods (Gschwandtner et al., 2018). We recommend adding security controls
based on threat intelligence, which complements and supplements compliance-driven security
controls. “Threat intelligence (TI) promises to provide actionable information about current
threats for information security management systems (ISMS)” (Gschwandtner et al., 2018).
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) platforms are being developed by many major cybersecurity
companies such as FireEye, ThreatConnect, McAfee, and many others to streamline and create
efficient and effective CTI capabilities, enabling an unprecedented ability to prioritize threats,
pinpoint key threat actors, understand their tools, techniques, and procedures (TTP), deploy
appropriate security controls, and ultimately, improve overall cybersecurity hygiene (Samtani
et al., 2019). We recommend considering a CTI platform because of its agility without much
human intervention. “As technological changes occur more quickly, auditors must keep pace
with emerging technological changes and their impacts on their client's data processing system
as well as their own audit procedures” (Rezaee & Reinstein, 1998). When selecting a control
55

assessor or team of assessors, we recommend selecting the assessor or assessors with deep
technical knowledge regarding the systems and their security. Table 8 shows our
recommendation regarding security awareness and training and what controls to enhance in the
NIST 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls (NIST, 2020).
Cybersecurity Insurance
Cybersecurity insurance pays for a company to hire a cybersecurity corporation that
conducts a forensic investigation to reveal precisely what happened in an attack (Morris, 2021).
It pays for the legal services required after the attack. Suppose the cyber attack leads to people
filing litigation against a company. In that case, the insurance will step in to pay for defense
attorneys and a settlement or court-awarded damages to the plaintiffs (Morris, 2021). “But
despite the importance of cyber insurance as one of the tools for organizations to manage their
cyber risks, there are still problems relating to this market which have persisted over the years,
mainly in aspects of the lack of information and knowledge that affect market maturity and the
willingness to use it” (Pavel, 2020). It is no wonder why organizations are lagging in adopting
cybersecurity insurance in their security programs.
Since APT attacks involve data exfiltration and an organization can go bankrupt after a
successful cyberattack, we recommend adding cybersecurity insurance to the organization’s
security program. “When appropriately managed, cyber insurance can become another tool in
the risk management toolbox” (Christopher, 2017). “Security is more than technical controls,
and insurance can help provide true financial controls to cyber security” (Christopher, 2017).
There is published research with a strong argument for making cybersecurity insurance
mandatory for SMEs (Lemnitzer, 2021).
Table 8 shows our recommendation regarding security awareness and training and what
controls to enhance in the NIST 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls (NIST, 2020).
Table 8.

Independent Variables and Corresponding Security control(s) to Be Enhanced
Independent Variable

Security Controls

NIST Control
CA-2 CONTROL ASSESSMENTS

Action Item
Enhance the security control by
making sure that the assessor or
assessment team selected for
assessment has deep technical
knowledge of the systems and their
security.
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Redundant IDS/IPS

ACCESS Control Group: AC-1 to

Enhance the applicable controls based

AC-25

on threat intelligence feeds.

PL-2 SYSTEM SECURITY AND

Enhance the control based on the

PRIVACY PLANS

threat intelligence feeds.

SI-4 SYSTEM MONITORING

Enhance the control with redundant
IDS/IPS systems to monitor the
network and systems.

Security Awareness and Training

AT-2 LITERACY TRAINING AND

Enhance the control by applying the

AWARENESS

APAT (Analyze, Predict, Awareness,
and Test) model.

Cybersecurity Insurance

PM-1 INFORMATION SECURITY

Enhance the control by adding a plan

PROGRAM PLAN

to procure cybersecurity insurance.

PM-4 PLAN OF ACTION AND

Enhance the control by purchasing

MILESTONES PROCESS

cybersecurity insurance.

PM-9 RISK MANAGEMENT

Enhance the control by adding

STRATEGY

cybersecurity insurance as a risk
transfer method.

Chapter Summary
Since Security Awareness and Training, Security Controls, Redundant IDS/IPS, and
Cybersecurity Insurance positively influence the sense of security, we suggested our
recommendations to enhance their effectiveness. We recommended a cyber security awareness
measurement model called Analyze, Predict, Awareness, and Test (APAT) to implement
security awareness and training. In the case of Security Controls, we recommended adding
security controls based on threat intelligence, which complements and supplements
compliance-driven security controls. We recommended taking advantage of Cyber Threat
Intelligence (CTI) platforms to manage security controls. As part of our recommendations, we
stressed the importance of implementing Redundant IDS/IPS and purchasing cybersecurity
insurance.

57

CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Since we completed all phases of the planned research, in this chapter, we present the
summary of the research, limitations, contributions, and future work of this research.

Research Summary
The purpose of our research is to determine why technological solutions fail to protect
organizations from APTs and decide which security controls need to be implemented, finetuned, and enhanced, along with technical solutions to protect organizations from APTs. The
research study identifies security policies, procedures, and configurations to focus on in the
pursuit of defeating advanced persistent threats (APTs).
Despite all the awareness, technological advancements, and massive investment, the
fight against APTs is a losing battle. It seems logical to look at how APT defenses are set up
and consider whether organizations are in a false sense of security. Shall organizations need to
think about new strategies to detect APTs? Shall organizations need a paradigm shift in setting
defenses against APTs? In this research, our objective is to contribute to the cybersecurity
domain by verifying whether there is a false sense of security among organizations. If a false
sense of security does exist among organizations, our research highlights what is missing when
considering the defenses to prevent APT attacks.
Our research study began with the following research questions:
▪

RQ1. Are organizations in a false sense of security while relying on off-the-shelf tools
to protect against APT attacks?

▪

RQ2. What are the most critical factors (practices/controls) contributing to the false
sense of security? Is there any relationship among the factors contributing to the false
sense of security?

▪

RQ3. Does organizational culture influence the setup of defenses against APT attacks?
58

In our literature review, we found the following:
•

Cyber attackers outclass off-the-shelf solutions.

•

Employees need security education and a sober understanding of the protection systems
in place to secure their key assets.

•

If critical/basic security controls are not in place, it makes no sense to do advanced
controls like SOAR.

•

Heavy focus on tools to prevent APT attacks, non-technical attack vectors like insider
threat and social engineering are not given much-needed attention.
Based on the literature review, we defined research constructs, research model,

operational definition of constructs, hypothesis statements, and research method. The research
is survey-based quantitative research; based on the survey outcome, we planned to propose
remediations regarding implementing and enhancing security policies, procedures, and
configurations to set up defenses against APTs.
In the research implementation phase, a survey was distributed to 600 qualified
participants using email and LinkedIn. There were 253 returned questionnaires out of the 600
distributed. 207 out of 253 returned questionnaires were useable, i.e., 82% completion rate.
After the survey was completed, using R Studio, CFA was performed to ensure that the
instrument appropriately measures the latent constructs. We used R and R Studio to conduct
CFA. The factors with factor loading values of < 0.7 are ignored to condense the number of
observable variables. After CFA, the research model was fed to Warp PLS to conduct SEM
analysis. Before performing SEM analysis, Warp PLS checks for highly correlated constructs.
Convergent Testing and Insider Threat Prevention constructs had correlations greater than 0.85
with other constructs in the research model. So, we removed Convergent Testing and Insider
Threat Prevention constructs from the research model. We fed the updated research model to
Warp PLS again to perform SEM. No high correlations were found among the constructs in the
updated research model.
We evaluated measurement and structural models before proceeding to evaluate the
hypotheses. As part of the measurement model assessment, first, we verified that factor loading
values are above 0.708. Next, we observed that internal consistency reliability, convergent
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validity, and discriminant validity measures are in the desired range. As part of the structural
model assessment, we verified that no multicollinearity exists, and predictive power and
relevance are in the desired range. After successfully validating both measurement and
structural models, we tested hypotheses statements using path coefficient and p values. In the
hypotheses testing, we found that a) successful implementation of security awareness and
training positively impacts the sense of security (H1 supported) b) successful implementation
of security controls positively impacts the sense of security (H3 supported) c) successful
implementation of segmentation does not impact the sense of security (H4 not supported) d)
successful implementation of redundant IDS/IPS positively impacts the sense of security (H5
supported) e) successful execution of cybersecurity insurance purchase positively impacts the
sense of security (H7 supported) f) organizational culture moderates the relationship between
security awareness and training and the sense of security (H8 supported) g) organizational
culture moderates the relationship between security controls and the sense of security (H10
supported) h) organizational culture moderates the relationship between segmentation and the
sense of security (H11 supported) i) organizational culture does not moderate the relationship
between redundant IDS/IPS and the sense of security (H12 not supported) j) organizational
culture does not moderate the relationship between cybersecurity insurance and the sense of
security (H14 states that).
Since Security Awareness and Training, Security Controls, Redundant IDS/IPS, and
Cybersecurity Insurance positively influence the sense of security, we suggested our
recommendations to enhance their effectiveness. We recommended a cyber security awareness
measurement model called Analyze, Predict, Awareness, and Test (APAT) to implement
security awareness and training. In the case of Security Controls, we recommended adding
security controls based on threat intelligence, which complements and supplements
compliance-driven security controls. We recommended taking advantage of Cyber Threat
Intelligence (CTI) platforms to manage security controls. As part of our recommendations, we
stressed the importance of implementing Redundant IDS/IPS and purchasing cybersecurity
insurance.
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Limitations
The limitations of this research include: 1) We reached out to 600 qualified participants
and received 253 returned questionnaires. Our survey response rate was close to 42%. We had
sufficient data to conduct data analysis. However, it will be great to receive more survey
responses. 2) Because the survey is about employee perception of corporate security posture
and the survey population is security professionals, it is possible that more than half of the
survey population did not feel comfortable responding to the survey even though it was
anonymous. 3) Our research is the first of its kind, studying the employees’ perception of
security posture vs. corporate security measures. We could not find a model to adopt from the
existing information systems literature. 4) Since we dropped Convergent Testing from our
research model, we could not study the construct further to identify the gaps left by the standard
security testing methodologies like OSSTMM, OWASP, NIST, PTES, and ISSAF. 5)
Cybersecurity is a vast domain. It is hard to select and limit the number of independent variables
in the research.

Contributions
Despite all the awareness, technological advancements, and massive investment, the
fight against APTs is a losing battle for organizations. The objective of our research is to
discover why technological solutions fail to protect organizations from APTs and is there
something organizations are missing when setting up defenses against APTs. We started our
research with three research questions formally: 1) Are organizations in a false sense of security
while relying on off-the-shelf tools to protect against APT attacks? 2) What are the most critical
factors (practices/controls) contributing to the false sense of security? Is there any relationship
among the factors contributing to the false sense of security? 3) Does organizational culture
influence the setup of defenses against APT attacks?
Our research found that organizations in a false sense of security while relying on offthe-shelf tools to protect against APT attacks. We studied the relationship between the
effectiveness of security controls and the sense of security of employees. Our research study
highlighted that sense of security of the employees is low when the security controls are
ineffective. Our research suggests that organizations do need a paradigm shift while setting up
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defenses against APT attacks; focusing on the effectiveness of the security controls is the key.
Our research identified the effectiveness of Security Awareness and Training, Security
Controls, Redundant IDS/IPS, and Cybersecurity Insurance are the key factors influencing the
sense of security of the employees. Not only did we identify Security Awareness and Training,
Security Controls, Redundant IDS/IPS, and Cybersecurity Insurance as the important factors
influencing the sense of security of the employees, but we also suggested how to implement
them effectively. Our research identified organizational culture does play a role in influencing
the relationship between Security Awareness and Training, and Security Controls. Our
contribution to the industry is to highlight the paradigm shift required for organizations while
setting up defenses against APTs. While organizations focus on setting up security controls to
satisfy the compliance requirements, we emphasize the importance of the effectiveness of
security controls.

Future Work
Despite all the awareness training, technological advancements, and massive
investment, this research confirms that employees are not confident about the cybersecurity
posture of organizations. Our research identified what influences the employee perception of
cybersecurity posture or sense of security. Organizations need to consider not only
implementing the security measures but also their effectiveness. Organizations rely on
analytical reports generated by tools to validate the effectiveness of security measures
implemented. However, they rarely consider the employee perception or confidence about the
implemented cybersecurity measures. Employee feedback on security measures is a great
additional method to validate the effectiveness of the implemented security measures.
Employee feedback helps to check the real effectiveness of security measures and may help to
invest the security budget in the right place. The research confirms that organizations need a
paradigm shift in protecting themselves against APTs. We dropped two independent variables,
convergent testing and insider threat prevention, because of the correlations with the
segmentation. In further research, the two constructs we dropped may need to be reevaluated to
find out what caused correlations because of their presence. Further, additional independent
variables could be considered in the research model.
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS (FACTORS)
The following is the questionnaire distributed to cybersecurity professionals with five
or more years of work experience and work for a private (for-profit) organization.
Table 1.

Questions (Factors) - Security Awareness and Training

Construct (Latent Variable)

Questions

References

Security Awareness and Training

Q2. Do you agree that organizations have

(Al-Daeef et al., 2017)

actively managed security awareness and

(Bada et al., 2014)

training programs?

(Wilson & Hash, 2003)

Q3. Do you agree that the security

(IBM, 2020)

awareness and training programs prepare

(Carella et al., 2017)

an organization's employees to thwart
cyber threats?
Q4. Do you agree that organizations test
all employees periodically regarding
security awareness by sending spoof
phishing emails?
Q5. Do you agree that organizations
mandate all new employees to take
security awareness training before
working on their job-related activities
without exceptions?
Q6. Do you agree that organizations'
security awareness training programs
provide no significant value to prevent
cyberattacks?

Table 2.
Construct (Latent Variable)
Segmentation

Questions (Factors) - Segmentation
Questions

References

Q7. Do you agree that network

(Palo Alto Networks, 2019)

segmentation is a typical security practice

(Vincentis, 2017)

in organizations? Example: development,

(Gordon et al., 2016)

research, quality, and production teams

(Bradbury, 2019)

reside on different segments of the
network and cannot talk to each other
directly.
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Q8. Do you agree that organizations keep
databases on a segmented and isolated
network?
Q9. Do you agree that organizations keep
their confidential data segmented into
multiple tables residing in databases on
segmented networks? (Microsegmentation
of data: If one database and one network
are compromised, cybercriminals cannot
get the complete data leading to personal
and confidential data exposure.)
Q10. Do you agree that organizations keep
their source code repository segmented?
(All source code cannot reside in a single
repository. If the source code repository is
segmented, it becomes harder for
cybercriminals to steal source code and
product designs)
Q11. Do you agree that organizations
permit their employees to access source
code repositories outside the corporate
network without a VPN connection?
Q12. Do you agree that organizations
enforce a policy preventing employees
from sending source code as text (by
email) outside the corporate domain?
Q13. Do you agree that an organization’s
network access policy covers
interdepartmental network access to
enforce the security principle “need to
know”?
Q14. Do you agree that organizations
continuously monitor logs of source code
repositories along with network and
database access logs for security events?
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Table 3.
Construct (Latent Variable)
Cybersecurity Insurance

Questions (Factors) - Cybersecurity Insurance
Questions

Reference

Q16. Do you agree that organizations

(Cybersecurity Insurance | CISA,

carry a cybersecurity insurance policy to

n.d.)

survive financially after a significant
security incident?
Q17. Do you agree that organizations
actively maintain an asset inventory list
with raking from high value to low
value?

Table 4.
Construct (Latent Variable)
Insider Threat Prevention

Questions (Factors) - Insider Threat Prevention
Question

References

Q18. Do you agree that organizations have an

(Ben & Bhat, 2020)

actively managed insider threat prevention

(Greitzer et al., 2019)

program?

(Spooner et al., 2018)

Q19. Do you agree that organizations enforce

(Greitzer et al., 2019)

a policy preventing employees from sending
documents/images/any attachments outside
the corporate domain?
Q20. Do you agree that organizations have an
actively managed BYOD policy for
employees to connect to the corporate
network to access email, MS Office, etc.?
Q21. Do you agree that organizations install
mobile device management (MDM) software
on employees' mobile devices without any
exception if the employees can access
corporate email, office software, etc.?
Q22. It is common for organizations to let
employees access the corporate network from
public WiFi or home network using their
personal or corporate mobile devices. Do you
agree that organizations can remotely wipe
out an employee's mobile device if the
mobile device is stolen or lost?
Q23. Do you agree that organizations install
DLP (Data Loss/Leak Prevention) software at

77

the network level in organizations’
environments?
Q24. Do you agree that organizations install
a DLP (Data Loss/Leak Prevention) software
on all employee laptops who potentially carry
confidential business and customer data
Q25. Do you agree that organizations enforce
a policy regarding the use of external hard
drives or USB drives with corporate devices?
Q26. Do you agree that organizations
perform threat hunting activities, either
manually or automated?
Q27. Do you agree that organizations use
behavior analytics tools to monitor privileged
accounts and suspected user accounts?
Q28. Do you agree that organizations have an
actively managed policy for source code
repository access?

Table 5.
Construct (Latent Variable)
Security Controls

Questions (Factors) - Security Controls
Questions

References

Q29. Suppose organizations use a tool to

(InfoSecurity Magazine, 2012)

deploy software updates/patches

(IBM Cloud Education, 2019)

automatically. Do you think organizations

(Moore et al., 2015)

have an actively managed process to conduct

(Muckin & Fitch, 2019)

periodic checks to verify the installation of

(Lefkowitz, 2018)

updates/patches?

(Deloitte, 2010)

Q30. Do you agree that organizations have

(Koschorreck, 2011)

an actively managed policy to assess and

(Conrad, 2014)

consume third party (software and

(Grossman, 2013)

infrastructure) service providers

(Souppaya & Scarfone, 2013)

(SaaS/PaaS/IaaS)?
Q31. Do you agree that organizations
undertake appropriate due diligence before
engaging third-party service providers to
protect themselves from supply chain attacks
Q32. Do you agree that organizations have
appropriate contractual mechanisms to be
notified quickly of potential security issues
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with SaaS/IaaS/PaaS/other cloud service
providers?
Q34. Do you agree that organizations
implement processes and tools to monitor
security controls continuously?
Q35. Do you agree that audit requirements
drive the implementation of security controls
in an organization but not an ever-changing
security posture?
Q36. Do you agree that satisfying audit
requirements drive the security budget
instead of holistic security requirements?
Q37. Do you agree that in between audit
cycles, maintaining/managing security
controls get less attention?
Q38. Do you agree that compliance standards
like NIST, PCI, etc. are static and do not
update with the changing threat landscape?
Q39. Do you agree that security controls
implemented to meet audit requirements are
insufficient to protect an organization from
cyberattacks?
Q40. Do you agree that auditors verifying the
security controls generally lack in-depth
security knowledge but go by a checklist?
Q41. Do you agree that auditors randomly
verify the security controls, but not
necessarily the essential security controls
because of their missing in-depth security
knowledge?
Q42. Do you agree that successfully meeting
audit requirements regarding the security
controls guarantees protection for an
organization from the known security
threats?

Table 6.
Construct

Questions (Single Factors) All Remaining Variables
Question (Measure)
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Reference

Converged Testing (Latent Variable)

Q15. Do you agree that organizations

(Chapple et al., 2018)

design security tests (penetration tests,
blue teaming, red teaming, etc.) to test
all security controls (defenses-in-depth)
at the same time? (Security controls in
this context include both administrative
and technical.)
Redundant IDS/IPS (Latent Variable)

Q33. Having multiple products

(Cheng et al., 2012)

monitoring network traffic makes it

(Kilic, Hakan Katal, Neset

easier for analysts to confirm the validity

Sertaç , Selcuk, 2019)

of alerts, identify false positives, and

(K. Scarfone & Mell, 2007)

provide redundancy. Do you agree that
organizations implement multiple
IDS/IPS products monitoring their
network?
Sense of Security (Dependent Variable)

Q43. Are you confident about the
cybersecurity posture (state) of
organizations?

Organization's Size (Moderator) ** Not

Q44. What is the size of your

included in the study

organization?

Organization's Culture (Moderator)

Q45. What is the culture of your
organization?

Organization's Industry Sector

Q46. Which of the following best

(Moderator) ** Not included in the

describes the industry sector of your

study

organization?
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(Murayama et al., 2006)
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